Modelo constitutivo del juicio moral de Jesse Prinz: Una lectura crítica

  • José Oliverio Tovar Bohórquez Universidad del Valle

Resumen

El propósito del presente ensayo es presentar una lectura crítica del modelo de constitución concebido por Jesse Prinz. De acuerdo con los modelos más significativos que se han producido hasta el momento, el juicio moral es el resultado de procesos cognitivos específicos, ya sean estos de tipo intuitivo, emocional o racional. Según afirma Prinz, la perspectiva sentimentalista sostiene que tales juicios son causados por emociones. En contraste, él defiende una tesis según la cual el juicio moral está constituido, no es causado, por aquéllas. En este artículo se presentará el argumento con el que Prinz sustenta su propuesta y se expondrán algunas inconsistencias.

Biografía del Autor

José Oliverio Tovar Bohórquez, Universidad del Valle
Profesor titular de la Universidad del Valle. Doctor  en Filosofía y Filósofo por la Universidad Nacional. Sus principales áreas de trabajo y de investigación son: la filosofía de la educación, la filosofía moral, la neuropsicología moral y la psicología moral.

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Publicado
2017-04-06
Como citar
TOVAR BOHÓRQUEZ, José Oliverio. Modelo constitutivo del juicio moral de Jesse Prinz: Una lectura crítica. Praxis Filosófica Nueva Serie, [S.l.], n. 44, p. 107-118, abr. 2017. ISSN 2389-9387. Disponible en: <http://revistas.univalle.edu.co/index.php/praxis/article/view/4351>. Fecha de acceso: 17 nov. 2017
Sección
Artículos

Palabras clave

sentimiento; emoción; juicio moral; modelo de constitución